Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 59 | Issue 2

1-1-1984

Book Reviews
Notre Dame Law Review Editors

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Notre Dame Law Review Editors, Book Reviews, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 485 (1984).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol59/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Article 6

BOOK REVIEWS
1850S TO
1980s. By Robert Stevens. Chapel Hill and London: University
of North Carolina Press. 1983. Pp. xvi, 334. $19.95.
LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
THE

Reviewed by James W Ey, Jr.*
Since World War II legal education has experienced a prolonged boom and has achieved high prestige within the university.
Yet paradoxically, law schools today are assailed from all directions.
Many students find legal education stifling and the faculty remote.
Harvard President Derek Bok recently observed that "legal education often seems tedious after the first year," and noted "the striking
lack of professional commitment displayed by many [law] students."'
Judges and practitioners question the level of practical training and
stress the acquisition of basic skills. A few states have even experimented with a mandated curriculum, thereby reducing the discretion of faculty and students. 2 Other units of the university doubt the
scholarly nature of legal education. 3 Radicals see the law school as a
handmaiden for corporate interests.4 Law professors worry that job
placement has increasingly overshadowed academic activity.3 At
once envied and distrusted, the law school surely occupies a unique
position in American higher education.
Indeed, by the mid-1980's law schools seem to be undergoing a
mild identity crisis. Two fundamental concerns lie at the heart of
this problem: What is the purpose of legal education? How can
these objectives best be accomplished? The effort to resolve these in*

Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; A.B., 1959, Princeton University; LL.B.,

1962, Harvard University; M.A., 1968, Ph.D., 1971, University of Virginia.
1 Bok, A FlawedSystem, HARVARD MAGAZINE, May-June 1983, at 38, 70.
2 Indiana and South Carolina require students to take certain subjects in law school
before being eligible for the bar examination. Boshkoff, Indiana'sRule 13. The Kilo-Loo Bird of
the Legal World, LEARNING AND THE LAW, Summer 1976, at 18; Slonim, State Court Tells Law
School What to Teach, 67 A.B.A.J. 26 (1981).
3 Bok contended: "[O]ther faculties often look askance at law professors for devoting
themselves to pedestrian forms of research, endlessly pecking at legal puzzles within a narrow
framework of principles and precedent." Bok, supra note 1, at 70.
4 Rockwell, The Education of the CapitalistLawyer: The Law School, in LAW AGAINST THE
PEOPLE 90 (R. Lefcourt ed. 1971); Nadar, Crumbling of the Old Order- Law Schools and Law
Firms, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 11, 1969, at 20.
5 Margolick, The Trouble With Americas Law Schools, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1983, § 6
(Magazine), at 20.
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quiries has produced a plethora of committee reports, but definitive
answers remain elusive. Thus, there is a notable degree of ambiguity
about the mission of the law school in our society.
Although offering no solutions, a retrospective glance at the
evolution of modern law schools assists in understanding the current
status of legal education. Yet, aside from institutional studies of a
few schools, 6 historians have paid little attention to the development
of law schools. 7 The timely appearance of Robert Stevens' Law
School 8 makes an important contribution to our knowledge of this
topic. Stevens traces the growth of the law school from its modest
origin to the pinnacle of success as gatekeeper for the legal profession.
Giving scant treatment to legal education in the colonial period and
the Jacksonian era,9 Stevens examines institutional training since the
1850's. In a chronological narrative the author probes a variety of
issues, duly noting the triumph of the case method and the emergence of Harvard atop a hierarchy of law schools. Three themes
dominate Stevens' account, and each warrants detailed
consideration.
I.

The Drive for Higher Standards

The development of modern law schools was directly tied to the
movement to raise standards for entry into the legal profession. Initially a year of formal legal instruction was seen merely as a supplement to traditional law office apprenticeship. Gradually, however,
leaders of the bar promoted systematic law school training in preference to often ill-supervised apprenticeships. Reform came slowly.
Stevens concludes that by 1895 the American Bar Association (ABA)
"had had virtually no impact in raising the educational standards of
lawyers" (p. 95). Bar admission requirements remained low, and
6

E.g., A.

SUTHERLAND,

THE LAW AT HARVARD:

A

HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MEN,

1817-1967 (1967); E. BROWN, LEGAL EDUCATION AT MICHIGAN, 1859-1959 (1959); F. ELLSWORTH, LAW ON THE MIDWAY (1977); P. MOORE, A CENTURY OF LAW AT NOTRE DAME
(1969). Such studies have been characterized as "tory legal history," preoccupied with institutional protection and professionalism. Konefsky & Schlegel, Mirror,Mirroron the Wall.- Histories ofAmerican Law Schools, 95 HARV. L. REV. 833, 843 (1983).
7 For other accounts of law schools, see J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW:
THE LAW MAKERS

256-76 (1950);

READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL

PROFESSION 216-35 (D. Nolan ed. 1980); W. H. BRYSON, LEGAL EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA,
1779-1979: A BIOGRAPHICAL APPROACH (1982).
8 R. STEVENS, LAw SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO
THE 1980s (1983).

9 See generally McKirdy, The Lawyer as Apprentice: Legal Education in Eighteenth Centuy
Massachusetts, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 124 (1976); Bloomfield, David Hojinan and the Shaping of a
Republican Legal Culture, 38 MD. L. REV. 673 (1979).
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"the majority of lawyers in the 1890s had seen the inside neither of a
college nor of a law school" (p. 95). The norm for institutional education expanded to three years, but until 1920 law was essentially an
undergraduate discipline. Students selected either law school or
college.
Organization of the Association of American Law Schools
(AALS) in 1900 heralded the start of a more successful effort to raise
educational standards. The ABA and the AALS joined to open a
sustained campaign on two fronts: 1) continually increasing standards required of accredited institutions, and 2) securing legislation
which imposed higher requirements on a host of thriving part-time
and proprietary schools. Member schools were pressured to curtail
night programs, while minimum standards governing library facilities and number of full-time faculty were imposed. Yet many law
schools could not meet these requirements, and consequently students before the 1920's flocked to unaccredited proprietary schools.
Moreover, until 1928 no state required attendance at a law school
before admission to practice. 10
A degree of coercion was necessary to eliminate non-AALS competitors. Leaders of the profession successfully pushed for a more
challenging bar examination, designed in part to deny admission to
students from proprietary schools. The ABA-AALS also promoted
state regulations mandating pre-legal college work. Starting in the
1930's the bar worked to require graduation from an accredited law
school as a prerequisite for entry to the profession. As a natural byproduct of these tighter requirements, the proprietary and night
schools were increasingly driven out of the market.
From the outset this move for higher educational standards was
bitterly controversial, with important implications for the practice of
law. "The leaders of the bar," Stevens observes, "were conscious
that, by calling for a more rigorous training and more systematic bar
examinations, entry to the profession would become narrower and, in
one respect at least, less democratic" (p. 25). Proprietary schools provided an inexpensive route by which minorities and recent immigrants could hope to become lawyers. Jerold S. Auerbach placed a
sinister interpretation upon these developments:
Although lawyers spoke the language of professionalism, their vocabulary often masked hostility toward those who threatened the
hegemony of Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture. Professionalism
10 Effective in 1928, West Virginia required two years of college and three years of law
school before admission to the bar (pp. 180-81).
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and xenophobia were mutually reinforcing. . . . [T]eachers and
practitioners began to play variations on the themes of anti-urbanism, anti-Semitism, and nativism."
Stevens gives a balanced assessment of the various motives behind the attack on proprietary schools. While recognizing the nativist impulse, he rightly emphasizes public interest, economic
advantage, and professional status as important factors. Unquestionably, the leaders of the movement for higher standards genuinely favored an educated bar and sought to protect the public from
incompetents. Accredited law schools feared the economic competition of large night schools and employed higher standards to bolster
their revenue position. Perhaps most important, however, was the
emergence in the 19th century of a culture of professionalism. Middle class Americans looked to professional careers, based upon merit,
as a major component of their self-identity. "By and large," one historian concluded, "the American university came into existence to
serve and promote professional authority in society."' 12 The drive for
ever higher academic standards and the dominance of AALS schools
largely reflected a deep desire to enhance the stature of the legal profession. Academic lawyers in particular directly benefited by this
trend. A strikingly similar development occurred in medicine, where
medical schools early achieved monopoly control over access to practice. 13 While other motives were more dramatic, the continued preoccupation with law school standards is best understood as part of a
widespread commitment to professionalism.
Robert H. Wiebe has attributed this appearance of professional
organizations in the late 19th century to the decline of the traditional
sense of community in the face of urbanization. Professional groups
and business associations abounded in the period 1880-1920, hastened by the emergence of modern graduate schools. Professionalism
helped to reestablish a degree of order at a time of rapid change in
American society. 14 Thus, the experience of legal education was not
unique. Numerous occupations sought to protect their position by
creating formal educational and entry requirements.
11 J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 99 (1976).
12 B. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM: THE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA x (1976).
13

Id. at 191-93, 297.

14

R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (1967).
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II. A Divided Heritage
A degree of schizophrenia pervades modern legal education. By
the 1950's, the ABA-AALS had swept nearly all before it. Proprietary schools were nearly extinct, and legal education had achieved
elevated status within universities. Law school admissions selectivity
markedly increased, aided by the appearance of the LSAT in 1948.
Legal education even weathered the turbulence of the late 1960's
with few structural changes. Despite this impressive record of accomplishment, however, all is not well in the law school community. The
persistent tension between practitioners and academics, which always hovered in the wings, has forcefully reemerged. This has been
highlighted by Chief Justice Warren Burger's repeated criticism of
the quality of trial lawyers. 1 5 Many leaders of the bar are unhappy
with the law schools which, ironically, they had done so much to
shape over the years. This reflects differing assumptions about the
role of legal education in society. "Legal education's heritage," Stevens observes, "was one of an inherent conflict between the professional and the scholarly" (p. 266).
This dichotomy was symbolized by the founding of the AALS to
represent the separate interests of legal educators. Proud of their
hard won academic reputations, many faculty members resented any
suggestion that law schools should teach trade subjects. Moreover,
law professors were naturally reluctant to allow any outsider to control their curriculum. Such a step would undermine the autonomy
and intellectual independence of law schools. In fact, elite law
schools with strong traditions of scholarship have been the most outspoken in resisting a practice-oriented scheme of instruction. The
sharp faculty debate during the 1970's over the place of clinical education also demonstrated a reluctance to deviate from established
methods and curriculum. Clinics, after all, smacked of practical education and even harkened back to the days of office apprenticeship.
They also competed with formal instruction for students and
financial resources. Thus, it is not surprising that clinics proved
controversial.
Yet, for all the claims of academic standing, one could ask
whether the law school has any real function apart from professional
preparation. If not, are legal educators guilty of believing their own
propaganda about law as an intellectual discipline? In 1918, Thorstein Veblen asserted that "the law school belongs in the modern uni15 N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1973, at 1, col. 3; Burger, Some FurtherReflections on the Problem of
Adequacy of Trial Counsel, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1980).
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versity no more than a school of fencing or dancing."' 6 Viewing law
schools as vocational in character, he further contended that law
teachers "stand in a relation to their students analogous to that in
which the 'coaches' stand to the athletes."' 17 Without adopting this
position, Stevens emphasizes the practical character of legal education. "Despite all the rhetoric," he concludes, "the American law
school was founded and developed as a professional school stressing
the knowledge needed to pass the bar examination and to succeed in
practice" (p. 266). Indeed, few institutions can afford to ignore the
career-oriented dimensions of their mission. For example, Hastings
College of Law faced a crisis in 1950 when 47 students failed the
California bar exam.' 8 This incident underscored the vocational
component inherent in formal legal education.
The friction between the scholarly and practical strains of legal
education has important implications for our understanding of modern law schools. For many years there was an intense fight over
whether faculty should be full-time academics or part-time practitioners. On one level, of course, the scholarly approach was triumphant, and law schools today are firmly in the hands of academics.
Stevens asserts that by the early twentieth century "the leading academics strengthened their position of intellectual leadership in the
legal life of the country" (p. 133). Nonetheless, overtones of the old
conflict remain. Should new faculty be selected solely upon scholastic record? Or is successful practice experience valuable in becoming
a law teacher? To what extent should professors be permitted to
practice law? Should bar associations be able to dictate the curriculum in order to stress practical skills? Or should law faculty teach
essentially theoretical subjects, relying on law firms to provide further training to young attorneys? No easy or categorical answers are
apparent.
This schizophrenia is strikingly evident in the field of scholarship. "Legal scholarship," Stevens declares, "was yet another area
whose purpose had been confused by the demands placed on the law
schools as they both assumed their role as the sole point of entry for
practice in the profession and also claimed legitimacy in the scholarly
confines of the university" (p. 270).

If the primary goal of law

schools is professional preparation, why should the faculty be expected to contribute scholarly literature? Few students really care
16 T. VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA 211 (1918).
17 Id.
18 T. BARNES, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW: THE FIRST CENTURY 302-18 (1978).
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what their professors have written. In fact, a law faculty typically
produces less scholarship than its counterparts in the liberal arts disciplines. At many schools teaching remains the most important skill,
and reputations are based on classroom performance. 19 This explains why so many legal scholars develop casebooks, thus blending
intellectual pursuits with teaching.
Still other questions perplex the legal academic. What is the
function of legal scholarship? Is it intended for practitioners or other
professors? In a recent article Stevens notes:
In general, the leading academics have failed to provide the profession's scholarship. .

.

. Indeed, to have written the standard

practitioner's work in a substantive field of law might well be the
kiss of death for one who wants to be employed in one of our
leading law schools. . . . [T]his confusion-and I think schizophrenia is the right word-has had a paralyzing effect. I suspect
that the reason there is little good legal scholarship-and all too
often little scholarship-is that the typical teacher in a typical
law school knows that it is not quite socially acceptable to write a
"professional" article and yet is not quite comfortable writing the
"academic" one. 20
Other commentators are more direct. Alfred S. Konefsky and John
Henry Schlegel have bluntly declared that "legal scholarship is in
many ways a bad joke." 21 The uncertain goal of legal scholarship
has yielded two classes of literature. Law reviews are filled with technical articles which closely analyze appellate decisions. At the same
time we find grandiose reflections about political philosophy, legal
history, and social order, topics with scant interest for practitioners.
The audience for this latter category is really other professors, or perhaps the occasional judge. One may wonder how long this split between the interests of many academics and the needs of the
profession can continue.
Moreover, there are conspicuous gaps in existing legal literature.
Empirical research is almost entirely lacking. Do statutes or judicial
rulings actually have an impact on how people behave? To what
extent are court decisions implemented? Do laws produce unanticipated results? There is surprisingly little knowledge about such fun1

19 For an earlier treatment of the diverse pressures on law faculty, see Bergin, The Law
Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L. REv. 637 (1968).
20 Stevens, American Legal Scholarship: Structural Constraintsand Intellectual Conceptualism, 33
J. LEGAL EDUc. 442, 445-46 (1983).
21 Konefsky & Schlegel, supra note 6, at 848-49.
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damental issues. 22 Bok declared that "legal scholars are rarely
trained in the methods of empirical investigation and hence do not
devote themselves to exploring the actual effects of legal rules on
human behavior. '23 But, he warned, this neglect may lead
"lawmakers and regulators . . . to have inflated and unrealistic no-

tions of their capacity to use legal rules to influence behavior.
III.

'24

A State of Equilibrium

Despite ever higher standards, Stevens pictures the modern law
school as intellectually stagnant. Rhetoric about curriculum reform
only masks the reality that few fundamental changes have been implemented in decades.2 5 "To record the development of curricula in
the post-1945 era," Stevens declares, "is thus, in so many ways, disheartening" (p. 210). In truth, the much heralded introduction of
seminars and clinical experiments was merely peripheral. The core
courses and the casebook method remain untouched. The widespread elimination of required courses, however, has compounded
the problem by producing an unfortunate fragmentation of legal
study. "The underlying purpose of courses," Stevens asserts, "still
often remained obscure and the sequential order of courses a mystery" (p. 277).

He even downplays the Realistic movement, sug-

gesting that its impact was restricted to a handful of elite schools (pp.
156-57).
Several factors contribute to this state of equilibrium. The vocational focus of students and the financial contraints of contemporary
university life give no impetus for major reform. The principal culprit, though, is the law faculty.
Why are law professors so antagonistic to curriculum reform?
First, there is a strong emotional tie to the status quo. Professors are
usually persons who excelled as students in handling the existing subjects. They naturally see no reason to alter the prevailing curriculum. Second, teachers share a self-interest in present instructional
patterns. Any substantial change is threatening. Reform might
render some courses obsolete or redundant, and the prospect of reassignment intimidates professors. The perceived need to specializein part to achieve scholarly goals-has deprived many law teachers
22

For a rare analysis of the impact ofjudicial decisions, see D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS

AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977).

23
24

Bok, supra note 1, at 43.
Id.
E. GEE & D. JACKSON, FOLLOWING

25
LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA (1975).

THE LEADER? THE UNEXAMINED CONSENSUS IN
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of readily transferable knowledge. Then, too, some professors are
lazy, and others wish to concentrate on research rather than preparation of new courses. Prestige among colleagues is also important, rendering reform of the first year curriculum particularly difficult.
Unlike the situation in other fields of study, law students usually
work hardest during their initial year. Thus, great pride of place
attaches to teaching first year courses, and any proposal to change
the existing line-up faces certain opposition.
This reviewer submits, however, that there is a still more fundamental reason for the lack of innovation in legal education-the
deadening influence of the law school pecking order. Many faculty
are obsessed with the ranking game,2 6 and hope above all else to
draw the attention of an elite school. "We also know," two scholars
contend, "that just about every law school became a little Harvard, if
only in its mind's eye."' 27 In such a climate teachers are reluctant to
deviate from the educational pattern of the most prominent schools.
Any change in the law school world tends to originate at the top.
The 1980's do not hold much prospect for innovation. Deans
typically lack the authority to restructure the work load of tenured
faculty, and curriculum committees do little more than process applications for new courses. Yet the proliferation of speciality courses
only adds to the incoherent jumble. Without external pressuresfrom the bar28 or the university administration-significant change
in the program of American law schools is virtually impossible.
The sameness of curricular offerings is matched by the composition of faculties. In 1967 Harvard Dean Erwin Griswold observed:
"Our faculties tend to reproduce themselves; and in the process may
by the continual inbreeding that is involved be producing even narrower law students than they were themselves. '29 The results of this
cloning process are striking. A recent study demonstrated that almost 60 percent of full-time law teachers graduated from only 20
institutions. One third of law professors were educated at five
26 At the 1983 annual meeting of the AALS Stevens chided law teachers: "You waste
time worrying about exactly where your law school is on the law-school pecking charts."
Stevens, supra note 20, at 447.
27 Konefsky & Schlegel, supra note 6, at 848.
28 In the mid-1970's the ABA tightened its accreditation standards which require law
schools to offer instruction in professional responsibility. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS: AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS OF RULES AND PRO-

CEDURES Standard 302 (1977). See generally O'Connor, Professional Competence and Social
Responsibility: Fu(ljfling the Vanderbilt Vision, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1983).
29 Sawyer, Dean CriswoldAttacks Faculty Inbreeding, Harv. L. Rec., Oct. 5, 1967, at 3.
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schools. 30 Inbreeding is most prevalent among elite institutions,
some of which hire predominately their own graduates. Although
educators praise faculty diversity in the abstract, uniformity has been
the governing rule in faculty selection. 3 1 The net effect is to underscore the dominance of elite feeder schools in the methodology and
content of legal education.
Conclusion
Stevens has amassed a wealth of information about law schools.
His assessment of educational trends is judicious and provocative.
The author squarely challenges the inflated self-image held by many
legal educators. Nonetheless, the value of Law School is limited in
several respects. Substantial portions of the volume were published
more than a decade ago, and show little sign of revision. 32 Stevens
depends heavily upon secondary works and official reports. Innovative techniques, such as oral history, are notably lacking. Yet systematic interviews would have been extremely helpful for the post-World
War II era.
In addition, the coverage of developments is skewed in important ways. Although Stevens makes a determined effort to treat the
history of state and proprietary schools, there is heavy emphasis upon
the charmed circle of elite institutions. Given the predominant influence of certain schools this may have been inevitable. Still, it is necessary to remember that the vast majority of law students are
prepared in non-elite schools. There is also a sectional bias. Stevens
gives relatively little attention to the development of legal education
33
in the South outside Virginia.
Despite his impressive background in English history, 34 Stevens
misses the opportunity to analyze legal education in comparative
terms. In Great Britain the study of law remains an undergraduate
pursuit, as had been the case in the United States before 1920. Students must complete a three-year program of legal studies at a uni30

Fossum, Law Professors: A Profile of the Teaching Branch of the Legal Profession, 1980 AM.

B. FOUND. RESEARCH

J. 501,

507.

31 There has been only limited attention given to the law faculty selection process. See
Bruce & Swygert, The Law Faculty Hiring Process, 18 Hous. L. REV. 215 (1981); Zenoff &
Barron, So You Want to Hire a Law Professor, 33 J. LEGAL EDuC. 492 (1983).
32 Stevens, Two Cheersfor 1870. The American Law School, in 5 PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN HISTORY 405 (D. Fleming and B. Bailyn eds. 1971).
33 The legal history of the South has generally been ignored. Ely & Calvani, Foreward."
Symposium on the Legal Histoiy of the South, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1979).
34 R. STEVENS, LAW AND POLITICS: THE HOUSE OF LORDS AS A JUDICIAL BODY, 18001976 (1978).
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versity or polytechnic school. Both prospective solicitors and
barristers are then required to take a further one year course offered
by professional societies. The British have retained a form of the apprenticeship system. After passing the necessary entrance examinations, prospective barristers must work a year as the pupil of a
practicing barrister. Aspiring solicitors must serve articles of apprenticeship for two years with a solicitor or a law firm.35 Does the English scheme, combining both an academic and a practical
component, offer advantages which we would do well to consider?
A word about the volume's style seems in order. Law School is
written in the manner of a law review article, with much of the most
interesting material buried in footnotes. This problem is compounded by the unfortunate decision of the publisher to place the
footnotes after each chapter rather than on the relevant pages.
These caveats should not detract from Stevens' achievement.
Law School is a solid and instructive study, which should be of interest to both lawyers and academics. Whether the current law school
malaise is merely a tempest in a teapot or a portent of more serious
troubles, only time will tell. But Stevens reminds us that American
legal education only assumed its modern form, after great conflict, in
relatively recent times. As it enters a steady state the comfortable
law school world may face some unpleasant moments in the 1980's.36
Such was the experience of our intellectual forebears.

35 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL EDUCATION (presented to Parliament by the
Lord High Chancellor) (1971); B. HOGAN, A CAREER IN LAw (1981); James, English Legal
Education and Practice, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 881 (1982).
36 Stevens concludes his book by warning that "some law schools could expect a rough
passage through the 1980s" (p. 276). More recently, he has predicted that law schools "can
look forward to a narrower and less important role in the future training of members of the
bar." Stevens, supra note 20, at 445.

By Robert B. Reich. New York:
Times Book Company. 1983. Pp. 324. $16.60.
THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER.

Reviewed by M. Neil Browne *
Several generations of American children have been taught that
our economic and political system is the best because it has resulted
in the greatest accumulation of material wealth. While this criterion
for measuring superiority has certain obvious flaws, the ability of the
American business and governmental system to generate impressive
economic growth rates has been, until very recently, unquestioned.
Now, however, a sharp change has occurred. The Japanese and most
Western European economies have recently been growing much
more rapidly than the faltering United States gross national product
per capita. Several of these economies are now richer than our own
in terms of per capita income (p. 16). If the creation of wealth is an
important measure of societal performance, we are in trouble.
Robert Reich's The Next American Frontier' diagnoses our current
ailment and suggests the direction which political remedies should
take. The bulk of the analysis is a historical account of the origins of
the managerial philosophy that Reich blames for our economic predicament. An organizational format that historically provided the
basis for our economic strength now threatens, according to Reich, to
hasten our relative decline as a wealthy nation. Managerial techniques aimed at high volume, simplified jobs, and the maximization
of individual output are all seen by Reich as anachronistic organizational objectives. Their continued use, not excessive regulation, high
taxes, or federal deficits, is the source of economic stagnation in
America (pp. 117-20). The initial section of this review will summarize Reich's contribution to the contemporary debate surrounding
our economic future. The final section provides an assessment of
Reich's reasoning.
I.
The Next American Frontier is divided into four parts. The introductory section provides a description of our present economic situa*

Professor of Economics, Bowling Green State University. B.A., 1965, University of

Houston; Ph.D., 1969, University of Texas; J.D., 1981, University of Toledo.
1 R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER (1983).
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tion, a comparison of our economy's performance with that of other
industrialized nations, and a brief synopsis of Reich's thesis that
faulty organization is responsible for declining American productivity. Parts two and three present a history of management as a profession in the United States. According to Reich, the development of
this profession along particular lines that were appropriate for mass
production enterprises had become, by 1970, a burden that has limited our ability to respond to new challenges by stronger international competitors. The final part of The Next American Frontier is the
briefest and most interesting. The book concludes with a discussion
of specific political and economic policies that Reich contends would
bring America into the modern industrial world presently dominated
by concerns about the quality, rather than quantity, of industrial
output.
A busy reader could acquire an accurate understanding of
Reich's entire analysis by perusing Part I of The Next American Frontier. Reich argues that Americans have discussed public policy utilizing a false dichotomy between government and business. In the
modern era, successful countries will be those who emphasize teamwork and collaborative consensus in both politics and markets. Since
the success of governments depends on the productivity of market
activities and since business behavior is increasingly shaped by governmental policy, businesses and governments are partners, not opponents (pp. 3-6). Reich returns to this theme repeatedly in the
book. He blames those who hold to the dream of an unfettered market for reducing the capacity of our workforce to work for common
ends (p. 279). Yet his policy proposals all rely on the business community as the implementation arm of a modern industrialization
policy.
"Consensus," "shared ends," and "cooperation" are important
concepts for understanding Reich's thought. Government, business,
labor and consumers are urged to unify their efforts instead of struggling to dominate one another. While Reich is very vague about the
goals which Americans should agree to cooperate in attaining, one
goal is evidently economic growth, since Reich's description of our
current inadequacies focuses on the slow pace of recent American
growth rates.
The bulk of Reich's book is historical. He argues that we cannot
revise our organizational structures (Reich's term for the rules and
objectives that guide a society's dominant organizations) unless we
understand that their evolution should be functional. Mass produc-
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tion leading to reduced unit cost is the fundamental organizational
structure that has guided both major American firms and governmental macroeconomic policy. High-volume production was a distinctly American contribution to organizational philosophy (pp. 2223). However, the large-scale systems of factories with simplified
work tasks that brought so much industrial success to the United
States from 1920 to 1970 are now foundering.
Part II of The Next Amen'can Frontier explains the role that management as an intellectual discipline played in directing the formation of large governmental agencies and business conglomerates.
Specialization of work through simplification of individual tasks, predetermined rules to coordinate the tasks, and detailed monitoring of
performance were the guiding principles of American scientific management (pp. 64-69). Especially significant in Reich's analysis is the
mobilization by the American government in World War II. During
this period, the legislative and executive branches of government
combined with business in the pursuit of efficient high-volume production. Ever since that cooperative era, business and government
have, according to Reich, embraced this objective and the hierarchical managerial principles it is presumed to require (pp. 92-101).
The largest section of the book is Part III, which pinpoints the
international changes that caused our post-1970 economic problems
and then extensively documents the efforts of those loyal to mass production organizational patterns to resist these changes. In the first
half of the twentieth century, American products were relatively free
from active competition with foreign made goods. Increasingly those
elements of domestic production that require high volume machinery
and relatively unskilled workers can be accomplished more cheaply
in developing countries. Between 1970 and 1980 alone imports from
these developing nations jumped 1000 percent (p. 122).
Japan, West Germany and other industrialized countries have
been highly responsive to this economic transition. Lacking an entrenched mass production mentality, they moved quickly to capitalize on what they (and we) can do best-produce those products that
require skilled workers. Reich contrasts "flexible system" organizational structures, that can encourage highly integrated responses to
new opportunities in such industries as precision castings, speciality
steel, luxury autos, sensor devices, lasers, and fine ceramics, with the
outdated mass production structures that predominate in our textile,
automobile, and steel industries. Flexible system production requires
that problem solving responsibility belong to everyone, since the in-
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tricacy of the production process prevents division of the work force
into a small problem solving cadre and a homogenous horde of unskilled workers (pp. 127-36).
Managers and workers resist the adaptation of American firms
to a flexible system because they realize that such a change reduces
the monetary worth of the experience they have accumulated in the
mass production system. Lawyers may be especially interested in
Chapter VIII, which contains Reich's description of "paper entrepreneurialism," the most common form of resistance practiced by
American managers. Paper entrepreneurialism consists of deploying
large numbers of creative accountants and lawyers whose task is to
rearrange industrial assets to increase cash flow. Reich deplores the
use of so many bright people in what he sees as a futile attempt to
stave off adaptation to flexible system production (pp. 141-60). His
point is that mergers and imaginative accounting offer only temporary profits because they create no new wealth; after a takeover the
consuming public has no more income or output than it had prior to
the transaction.
Government's role in slowing adaptation to international competition does not escape Reich's purview. Training programs for the
unemployed have overwhelmingly been designed for jobs in the high
volume, mass production industries (p. 203). Even if such training
were effective, the long run employment prospects for the trainees
would be grim. Foreign workers in undeveloped countries will do
unskilled labor at a lower cost. Reich counsels redirection of training
to jobs that promise ongoing employment in a flexible system of production, for example, optical workers, skilled assemblers, and computer operators.
When the public sector is called on to meet the housing, medical
and educational needs of the poor, Reich sees an opportunity to
channel social policy toward flexible system production (pp. 240-46).
Providing incentives to business to move toward production processes
that have growth potential can often take the form of rewarding
those firms which recognize that building a cooperative, healthy, and
creative labor force is good for business. Moreover, social programs
are a divisive factor in our national debates over the governmental
budget as long as they are regarded as public charities. Reich argues
that business people and politicians should all support increased
spending on health care, job training, housing, and nutritional programs for the poor because such expenditures, when made a part of
an economic development strategy, benefit us all (p. 219).
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Each of the specific policy proposals that constitute Part IV is
designed to create an economy in which employees are relatively secure in their jobs and there is very little difference in the status or
income of senior managers and junior employees. By investing in
workers, employers encourage employees to feel positively toward the
firm and consequently to welcome the change required by flexible
system production. Reich's emphasis on teamwork and egalitarianism at work as well as in our civic roles stems from his contention
that the key determinant of national well-being is a talented, cooperative labor force (pp. 257-66).
II.

One basic observation made by Reich is particularly significant
to his argument. Those who cling to the idea that private sector decisions can ever be free from political influence are grasping at a chimera. Thus, the key debate in every society should be the nature of
the inescapable interaction between business and government. Reich
strangely places the beginning of governmental management of the
economy in the World War I era. As Morton Horowitz recently
pointed out, the American government has been used by the dominant business interests as a facilitator of economic growth ever since
this country was founded. 2 Horowitz correctly points out what
Reich misses in his rush toward national consensus. Our legal system
has always been a tool through which competing interests could struggle for distributional predominance. Just as the legal structure was
shaped by the middle of the nineteenth century to reflect the market
oriented values of men of commerce and industry, 3 so will there always be attempts by farmers, workers, consumers, and other less
powerful groups to shape governmental policy for their benefit.
Reich does a creditable job of demonstrating that government
and business inevitably impinge on each other's performance. But he
makes the dubious assumption that since the civic culture (Reich's
term for the social justice objectives that he attributes to governments) and the market system interact, they have common objectives. To say that business and government share responsibility for
health, education, pollution, and transportation problems is hardly
proof that these responsibilities are pursued with identical value priorities. The excellent comparative statistics that Reich presents to
show the maldistribution of income and the high unemployment
2
3

M. HOROwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).
Id at 253-54.
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rates that characterize our economy (pp. 283, 286) should have
alerted him to the extent that the market oriented values of individualism, competition, and freedom for the property owner have prevailed over the values of cooperation, sharing, and egalitarianism
that Reich associates with governments.
Several other authors provide a more illuminating analysis of
the power struggle between these values. Charles Lindblom presents
a persuasive case that governmental policy must be generally pleasing to large corporations or risk the veto power these business interests possess. 4 Milton Friedman eloquently calls for greater
governmental adherence to the market values he espouses. 5 Robert
Solo has recently pointed out the negative way in which we envision
state action as an "intervention." '6 Governmental action is interventionist in nature only to the extent that we accept the preeminance of
market calculations of resource value. What all these analyses share,
and what Reich's does not, is an appreciation for the legitimate conflicts among competing communities and interest groups. Each recognizes that there can be no consensus about economic growth
strategies while there are ongoing struggles over the distribution of
income and wealth.
How does Reich fail to see the value and distributional conflicts
that shape the choice of either markets or government as the stimulus
for resolving particular problems? This form of moral blindness is
made possible by an argument framed in highly abstract terms.
Reich maintains that our economic problems are caused by faulty
organization (pp. 40-43). Unlike those analysts who delve into the
concrete competing interests that prefer particular organizational
modes, 7 Reich thinks in terms of a conflict between friends and foes
of effective organization. Reich's failure to see the ambiguity inherent in defining "effective" enables him to simplify issues. He seems to
say that there is no real conflict between selfishness and sharing; sharing benefits us all (p. 280). In some sense he is right: sharing may
ennoble the giver while materially benefitting the recipient, and may
in the long run benefit the giver by improving society as a whole.
However, the political potency of President Reagan and his supporters should be convincing evidence that potential sharers will require
4

C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS (1977).

5

M.
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R. SOLO, THE POSITIVE STATE (1982).
See J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE

7

FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE (1980).

ECONOMICS OF FEASIBLE SOCIALISM (1983).
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more than Reich's hortatory efforts to support the policy proposals
he suggests.
Although Reich explicitly dodges ideological considerations, his
policy suggestions clearly reflect his allegiance to liberal political values. Each proposal focuses on business implementation of programs
designed and evaluated by a liberal government pursuing social justice. The market emphasis on individual struggle is critized by Reich
as out of place in a flexible production system (p. 279). Beneath
Reich's feigned neutrality between the business and civic cultures lies
a clear preference for the traditional objectives of liberal thought.
Nowhere in his analysis of our current economic condition is there
any concern expressed about the dangers of overregulation, government deficits, or inflation. These standard conservative themes stem
from adherence to markets as a decision making mechanism. Reich
not only gives them no place in his analysis, he presents a lucid criticism of their habitual use by conservatives as a basis for ridiculing
government expansion (pp. 118-20). The consensus Reich apparently has in mind is one that reduces the role of markets as allocative
devices.
The Next American Frontier is noteworthy in that it provides a creative rationale for the type of policies preferred by liberal Democrats.
Reich's description of the type of industries that we should encourage
is compelling. As a nation we cannot hope to compete effectively in
mass production industries because our labor force is more highly
skilled and, hence, more highly paid. Where Reich is less convincing
is in his description of an egalitarian flexible system of production.
Arguments about the distributional implications of this suggested
change in managerial structure can be expected to be furious.

